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Abstract—This paper shows the susceptibility of spectrogram-
based audio classifiers to adversarial attacks and the transfer-
ability of such attacks to audio waveforms. Some commonly used
adversarial attacks to images have been applied to Mel-frequency
and short-time Fourier transform spectrograms, and such per-
turbed spectrograms are able to fool a 2D convolutional neural
network (CNN). Such attacks produce perturbed spectrograms
that are visually imperceptible by humans. Furthermore, the
audio waveforms reconstructed from the perturbed spectrograms
are also able to fool a 1D CNN trained on the original audio.
Experimental results on a dataset of western music have shown
that the 2D CNN achieves up to 81.87% of mean accuracy
on legitimate examples and such performance drops to 12.09%
on adversarial examples. Likewise, the 1D CNN achieves up to
78.29% of mean accuracy on original audio samples and such
performance drops to 27.91% on adversarial audio waveforms
reconstructed from the perturbed spectrograms.
Index Terms—Adversarial audio attacks, transferability, audio
reconstruction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Music genre classification is a challenging task for humans
[1]–[6] due to the subjectivity and unclear boundaries between
genres, and the uniqueness of musicians and artists. Yet, well
classifying music is of great interest to many researchers and
companies in the entertainment and arts industry. In the last
years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) became increas-
ingly popular due to their high accuracy and performance on
image datasets. Therefore, the focus in academia has been
on 2D CNNs. When it comes to audio and music process-
ing, CNNs have had a significant impact on several tasks
such as automatic music tagging [7], video clip classification
based on audio information [8], speaker identification [9],
environmental sound classification [10], [11] and music genre
classification [12]–[14].
Even if audio is a 1D signal, it is a common practice to use
2D representations, like spectrograms, when training machine
learning models. Due to their ability to model the human
peripheral auditory system [15], Mel-frequency cepstrum co-
eficient (MFCC) features are currently used for several audio
processing tasks such as music genre classification [16]. Mel-
frequency (MF) spectrograms, which use Mel-frequency filter
banks to represent the short-term power spectrum of audio
on the Mel-scale of frequency, are one of the most preferred
input types for music information retrieval [17]. One of the
main advantages of using 2D representations is that they
summarize high dimensional waveforms into compact time-
frequency representations while audio signals alone are noisier
[18]. Regardless of the type of spectrogram; as they are 2D
representations of audio signals, they can be treated as images.
Therefore, this opens up the opportunity to benefit from the
recent advances of deep neural networks in computer vision.
Recent works have exploited the capability of CNNs to
learn representations directly from spectrograms. Boddapati et
al. [19] use short-time Fourier transform (STFT), MFCC and
Cross Recurrence Plot (CRP) spectrograms with two different
2D CNN architectures (AlexNet and GoogLeNet) to classify
2D representations of environmental sounds. Lee et al. [20]
use 2D CNNs with MF spectrograms as input for music auto-
tagging. Pons et al. [21] use 40 bands MF spectrograms to
experiment with musically motivated CNNs and try under-
standing what CNNs learn from particular datasets. Pons et
al. [12] use MF spectrograms as input for a randomly weighted
CNN for music audio classification. Oramas et al. [22] use
constant-Q transform (CQT) spectrograms in their audio-based
approach for multi-label music genre classification.
Despite all advantages, it has been shown that approaches
based on 2D representations are susceptible to adversarial
attacks, which can easily fool these models and raise safety
concerns. Esmailpour et al. [23] have shown that the majority
of state-of-the-art approaches for audio classification relying
on 2D CNNs can be easily deceived, with fooling rates higher
than 90% and high confidence. 1D CNNs can also be easily
fooled by adversarial attacks. Abdoli et al. [24] demonstrated
the existence of universal adversarial perturbations that can
fool several audio processing architectures with attack success
rates between 91.1% and 74.7%, and signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) between 15.70dB and 19.62dB. Du et al. [25] proposed
a method based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) for
generating adversarial audio for end-to-end audio systems.
They evaluated their attacks on a range of applications
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like speech command recognition, speaker recognition, sound
event detection and music genre classification. The proposed
attack achieved a success rate of 89.30% on a 1D CNN and
91.20% on a convolutional recurrent neural network with SNR
of 15.39dB and 17.24dB respectively. However, the low SNRs
indicate that the adversarial perturbations are audible and can
be easily perceived by a listener.
Even if few works have already studied adversarial attacks
on both 1D and 2D CNNs [14], [23]–[25], none of them
have evaluated the transferability of such adversarial attacks
across representations, in particular from 2D to 1D. Generating
1D adversarial attacks is much more time-consuming than
generating 2D attacks due to the high dimensionality of audio
signals [23], as it requires computing a similarity measure
such as the `2-norm between legitimate and crafted examples
as a part of an adversarial optimization criterion. Therefore,
it might be advantageous to generate 2D perturbations and
transfer it to audio waveforms.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) we show that
the most effective adversarial attacks for images can also
attack spectrograms generated from music, which reveals the
vulnerability of 2D CNNs to non-specific attacks; (ii) we show
that perturbed spectrograms can be used to reconstruct audio
signals that are perceptually similar to the original audio, with
an SNR value of about 20dB; (iii) we show that the audio
waveforms reconstructed from the perturbed spectrograms can
also fool a 1D CNN trained on the original audio with high
confidence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
baseline 1D and 2D CNN architectures for music genre clas-
sification. Section III presents a description of the adversarial
attacks and the reconstruction process of the audio waveforms
from spectrograms. Section IV presents the dataset used, the
experimental protocol, and the experimental results. We com-
pare the performance of the 2D CNN model when using MF
and STFT spectrograms, and the vulnerability of such a model
to adversarial examples. We also evaluate the transferability of
adversarial perturbations from 2D representations to the audio
waveform and the susceptibility of a 1D architecture to such
a transferred attack. Finally, the conclusions and perspectives
of future work are presented in the last section.
II. 1D AND 2D CNN ARCHITECTURES
The aim of the proposed architecture is to deal with 2D
representations of audio signals of various lengths, learning
meaningful representations directly from spectrograms. First,
we split each audio waveform into fixed-length segments using
a sliding window of appropriate width. The window width
depends mainly on the signal sampling rate, which in the case
of the music dataset evaluated in this paper is 22,050 Hz.
In our approach, we use a window of five seconds (110,250
samples) because such a length provides the best trade-off
between the number of segments and accuracy. Furthermore,
there is also a certain percentage of overlapping between
successive audio segments, which aim is to maximize the
use of information. In our approach we use 75% overlapping
because such percentage of overlap provides the best trade-off
between the number of segments and accuracy. Furthermore,
the overlapping can be viewed as some sort of data augmen-
tation since it naturally increases the number of samples due
to the fact that some parts of the audio signal are reused.
Fig. 1 summarizes the process of splitting the audio file into
appropriate segments by the sliding window, then having the
signals converted to spectrograms, which are then used as
input to the 2D CNN. A similar process is used with the 1D
CNN except that the input of the CNN is audio segments, as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed approach for audio signal segmentation
by a sliding window, transformation of audio segments into spectrograms,
prediction by a 2D CNN and aggregation of prediction on the segments to
come up to a final prediction.
Fig. 2. Overview of the changes in Fig. 1 for the 1D approach. The 1D
CNN receives the waveform segments instead of spectrograms and provides
the predictions on segments for aggregation.
Moreover, the length of the original audio (before being
split) has a direct impact on the number of samples being
tested and trained, which may impact the computational cost
of the model. The GTZAN dataset has a sampling rate of
22,050 Hz and all original audio files are 30 seconds long.
STFT and MF are the main approaches for producing
spectrograms for music signals. To generate the STFT and MF
spectrograms, we use a fast Fourier transform (FFT) window
of length 512 and 256 samples between successive frames.
For the MF spectrograms we use 64 Mel filters. Therefore,
the spectrogram dimension becomes 431×257 for STFT, and
431×64 for MF. The architecture of the 2D CNN is the same
for both input formats and it has two convolutional layers
(CL), followed by a maxpooling layer to reduce the complexity
of the network, followed by another two CLs and another
maxpooling layer, which is connected to a fully connected
(FC) layer followed by an output layer. ReLU is used as
activation function in all layers but the last which uses softmax.
The weights of all of layers are initialized randomly. Batch
normalization is included between CLs and a dropout of 0.4
is used after the FC layer. The breakdown of the 2D CNN is
presented in Table I.
Several 1D CNN architectures have been proposed to deal
directly on the audio waveforms [24]. The 1D CNN model
receives 5-second audio segments as input and it has five one-
dimensional CLs, where the first CL employs a Gammatone
filter-bank. This layer is kept frozen during the training pro-
cess. Gammatone filters are used to decompose the input audio
signal to appropriate frequency bands. The output of the last
CL is used as input to one FC layer followed by an output
layer. Leaky ReLU is used as activation function in all layers
except in the last which uses softmax. The weights of all of
the layers are initialized randomly. This model was proposed
by Abdoli et al. [11] for environmental sound classification.
Batch normalization is included between CLs and a dropout
of 0.4 is used after the FC layer. The breakdown of the 1D
CNN is presented in Table II.
TABLE I
ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROPOSED 2D CNN
Layer # of Filter Stride Output Shape
Type Filters Size STFT MF
Input - - - 257, 431, 1 64, 431, 1
Conv2D 32 3, 3 1, 1 255, 429, 32 62, 429, 32
Conv2D 32 3, 3 1, 1 253, 427, 32 60, 427, 32
MaxPool - - 2, 2 126, 213, 32 30, 213, 32
Conv2D 64 3, 3 1, 1 124, 211, 64 28, 211, 64
Conv2D 64 3, 3 1, 1 122, 209, 64 26, 209, 64
MaxPool - - 2, 2 60, 103, 64 12, 103, 64
Dense - - - 1 024 1 024
Output - - - 10 10
During the classification step, since the input audio wave-
form is split into several segments, we need to aggregate the
2D CNN predictions to come up to a final decision on the
input audio, as illustrated in Fig. 1. For such an aim, we used
majority vote and the sum rule [11]. When there are K classes,
we generate K values and we choose the class which has the
TABLE II
ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROPOSED 1D CNN
Layer # of Filter Stride Output
Type Filters Size Shape
Input - - - 110 250
Conv1D Gamma 32 512 1 109 739
AvgPool - - 8 13 717
Conv1D 16 256 2 6 731
AvgPool - - 8 841
Conv1D 32 64 2 389
Conv1D 64 32 2 179
Conv1D 128 16 2 82
MaxPool - - 2 41
Dense - - - 256
Output - - - 10
maximum value as our final prediction. A similar process is
used to aggregate the predictions of the 1D CNN, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND AUDIO
RECONSTRUCTION
Adversarial attacks can be considered as small crafted
perturbations that, when intentionally added to a legitimate
example, lead machine learning models to misbehave [26].
Considering x as a legitimate example, then an adversarial
example x′ can be crafted in such a way that:
x ≈ x′, f∗(x) 6= f∗(x′) (1)
where f∗ is the post-activation function. Assuming that x is
a spectrogram, the crafted x′ should be unrecognizable by
human visual system.
Fig. 3. Overview of the 2D adversarial attack which relies on the 2D CNN
model and training dataset (spectrograms) to produce adversarial spectro-
grams. The audio waveform is reconstructed from the perturbed spectrogram
and used to fool the 1D CNN model.
Among the several algorithms for generating x′, the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [27] was one of the first
attacks, which still remains one of the most effective adversar-
ial attacks. Goodfellow et al. [27] introduced the FGSM for
generating simple adversarial samples. The method consists
of adding to the legitimate example x an imperceptibly small
perturbation that is equal to the product of a small constant
 and the sign of the gradient of the cost function J for the
model parameter w with respect to the input x and the true
label y, as shown in (2).
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(w,x, y)) (2)
The resulting adversarial example x′ carries a small pertur-
bation that cannot be seen by the human eye and effortlessly
deceives 2D CNNs and other non-deep architectures [23].
Kurakin et al. [28] introduced a straightforward way of
extending the FGSM method by applying it multiple times
with a small step size. Known as the Basic Iterative Method
(BIM), this adversarial attack is also able to fool complex 2D
CNNs. As illustrated in the upper part of Fig. 3, both FGSM
and BIM are white-box adversarial attacks which means that
both the trained 2D CNN model and the training dataset
should be accessible to the adversarial algorithms to fetch
its gradient information and generate the adversarial input x′
with unrecognizable differences to the legitimate input x. The
perturbed spectrogram can perhaps make a 2D CNN predict a
wrong label with high confidence. The lack of robustness of
2D CNNs to these two attacks was also observed for the task
of environmental sound classification [23], [29].
Fig. 4. The original STFT spectrogram and the perturbation produced by the
FGSM attack to generate an adversarial STFT spectrogram.
Fig. 4 shows an example of a legitimate STFT spectrogram
attacked with a perturbation produced by the FGSM attack.
Such a figure summarizes what happens with attacked STFT
and MF spectrograms: the difference between the adversarial
and legitimate spectrograms is imperceptible to the human
visual system. This aspect is very important, otherwise the
perturbation could not be considered as an adversarial one.
However, what happens with the perturbed signal in its original
representation space, that is, audio waveform? Will such
a perturbation remain unperceived by the human auditory
system?
A. Audio Reconstruction
The main contribution of this paper is to evaluate if after
performing adversarial attacks to the 2D representations and
successfully fooling the 2D CNN, such attacks could be
transferred to the audio waveform. If so, the perturbations
should not be perceptible by human auditory system on the
audio after reconstructing it from the perturbed spectrogram.
Besides evaluating the transferability of the adversarial attacks
across representations (from 2D to 1D), we also want to
evaluate if such an reconstructed adversarial audio is able to
fool an 1D CNN model which accomplishes the same task of
the 2D CNN. For such an aim, we need to reconstruct the
audio signals from the spectrograms.
The phase of the audio signal is fundamental to an accurate
reconstruction of the signal. However, both the STFT and
MF spectrograms do not contain information about the exact,
or even approximate, phase of the signal that it represents.
Therefore, it is not possible to reverse the process without
distorting the reconstructed signal.
To circumvent this problem, we can retain the phase infor-
mation separately and, depending on the type of spectrogram,
we can use such information to reconstruct the original audio
signal, which is the case of the STFT spectrogram. This
avoids the introduction of distortions to the reconstructed
audio signal, which may tamper or even mask the adversar-
ial perturbations embedded into the reconstructed adversarial
audio examples. On the other hand, to reconstruct the audio
signals from the MF spectrograms, it is necessary to estimate
the unknown phases iteratively using the Griffin-Lim (GL)
algorithm [30].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed 2D CNN for music genre classification was
evaluated on the GTZAN dataset. This dataset consists of
1,000 30-second audio clips evenly distributed into 10 classes:
Blues, Classical, Country, Disco, Hip-Hop, Jazz, Metal, Pop,
Reggae and Rock. The audio samples were collected from a
variety of sources in order to represent a variety of recording
conditions [31]. Even if the GTZAN dataset has several known
problems with its integrity, such as replications, mislabeling,
and distortions [14], [32], this does not affect our experiments
since our aim is not assessing the accuracy of CNN models,
but their vulnerabilities against adversarial attacks.
The 1,000 audio files were shuffled and divided into three
folds with 340, 330 and 330 samples, respectively. Fold 1
contains 34 tracks of each of the 10 genres; Folds 2 and 3
contain 33 tracks of each genre. Every track of every fold was
split into 21 short segments according to the sliding window
described in Fig. 1. The next step was to generate spectrograms
of all 21,000 audio segments. The model was first accessed
with MF spectrograms and then STFT spectrograms. Two
folds were used for training and 20% of the training set was
used for validation. The third fold was used for testing. After
predicting the music genre for each segment on the testing set,
the predictions for all 21 windows belonging to the same song
are aggregated with majority vote and sum rule to determine
the final genre prediction for the whole track. Each network
was trained up to 100 epochs with batch sizes of 50 samples
and early stopping. The model’s performance for each input
type is presented in Table III. The performance reported in
Table III is far from the best performance already achieved
for such a dataset which is about 90% [33]. On the other
hand, the results are similar to Kereliuk et al. [14] that used
two different 2D CNN architectures and achieved 81.20% of
mean accuracy for the same dataset. Furthermore, we did not
attempt to fully optimize the performance of the 2D CNN to
reduce the risk of overfitting, as it can potentially increase the
susceptibility of CNNs to adversarial attacks.
TABLE III
MEAN ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE 2D CNN FOR
STFT AND MF SPECTROGRAMS.
Mean Accuracy ± SD (%)
Input Segments MV Aggregation SR Aggregation
STFT 67.09±1.49 75.84±1.92 75.64±2.09
MF 75.29±2.50 81.87±2.49 81.37±2.20
MV: Majority Voting; SR: Sum Rule; SD: Standard Deviation
Table IV shows the performance achieved by the 1D CNN
on original audio waveforms as well as on the waveforms
reconstructed from the STFT spectrogram with the original
phase information. The performance achieved on the recon-
structed audio is slight better than that achieved on the original
audio. This is a clear indication that the reconstruction process
is accurate and it does not insert spurious noise to the signal.
TABLE IV
MEAN ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE 1D CNN FOR
ORIGINAL AUDIO AND AUDIO SIGNAL RECONSTRUCTED FROM STFT
SPECTROGRAM AND PHASE INFORMATION.
Mean Accuracy ± SD (%)
Input Segments MV Aggregation SR Aggregation
Original 70.82±0.20 77.69±0.81 77.99±1.04
STFT Recons 71.87±0.67 78.49±0.26 78.29±0.72
MV: Majority Voting; SR: Sum Rule; SD: Standard Deviation
Table V shows the results of the FGSM and BIM attacks
against the 2D CNN. We evaluate the mean accuracy achieved
by the model on the perturbed spectrograms. For both STFT
and MF spectrograms the BIM attack is more successful due
to its iterative nature. For instance, considering the best result
of Table III, the mean accuracy for STFT spectrogram drops
from 75.84% to 11.58% and from 81.87% to 12.09% for the
MF spectrogram.
Table VI shows the performance of the 1D CNN on the
adversarial audio samples generated by the reconstruction of
the STFT spectrogram perturbed with FGSM and BIM. The
mean accuracy drops from 77.99% on the original audio to
27.91% on the examples attacked by FGSM. We did not
evaluate audio examples reconstructed from MF spectrograms
because even the reconstruction of legitimate examples is very
TABLE V
MEAN ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE 2D CNN AFTER
ATTACKING STFT AND MF SPECTROGRAMS WITH FGSM AND BIM
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS.
Mean Accuracy ± SD (%)
Input Attack Segments MV Aggreg. SR Aggreg.
STFT FGSM 17.40±1.20 17.35±0.97 16.76±1.19
BIM 13.26±1.20 11.58±0.97 9.89±1.19
MF FGSM 21.52±1.80 19.32±1.46 19.41±0.88
BIM 15.38±1.99 12.09±2.01 12.49±1.88
MV: Majority Voting; SR: Sum Rule; SD: Standard Deviation
noisy due to the approximate phase estimation by the GL
algorithm.
TABLE VI
MEAN ACCURACY AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR THE 1D CNN AFTER
RECONSTRUCTING AUDIO FROM STFT SPECTROGRAMS ATTACKED WITH
FGSM AND BIM ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS.
Mean Accuracy ± SD (%)
Input Attack Segments MV Aggreg. SR Aggreg.
STFT Recons FGSM 26.45±1.09 28.00±0.98 27.91±0.85
BIM 30.76±2.03 33.85±3.45 33.35±3.67
MV: Majority Voting; SR: Sum Rule; SD: Standard Deviation
Finally, we need to evaluate if the adversarial perturbation
added to the spectrogram will remain unrecognizable by
human auditory system when the audio waveform is recon-
structed from the adversarial spectrogram. For such an aim we
conducted two experiments: (i) a quantitative experiment using
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as a metric to measure the level of
the noise with respect to the original signal; (ii) a qualitative
listening experiment with expert and non-expert listeners.
SNR has been used by previous works to evaluate the qual-
ity of the generated adversarial audio by measuring the level
of the perturbation on the signal after adding the perturbations
[14], [24], [25] and it is defined as:
SNRdB(xr,v) = 20. log10
P (xr)
P (v)
, (3)
where xr denotes the audio reconstructed from the legitimate
spectrogram and v denotes the adversarial noise. P (.) is the
power of the signal or noise, which is defined as:
P (x) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
n=1
x2n, (4)
where xn denotes the n-th component of the signal x. A high
SNR indicates that a low level of noise is added to the audio
signal by the adversarial perturbation.
According to Du et al. [25], the noise is imperceptible
when SNRdB is equal or greater than 20dB. This is also
supported by the experiments carried out by Abdoli et al. [11]
for environmental sound classification1. Table VII shows the
1See: https://sajabdoli.netlify.com/publication/uap/ for some audio samples
mean SNR achieved on the reconstructed audio from the
spectrograms attacked by FGSM and BIM, and None refers to
the SNR between the original and reconstructed audio. In the
case of STFT spectrograms, which uses the phase information
in the reconstruction process, the reconstructed audio is more
accurate and it becomes equivalent to the original audio
(SNR > 90dB). On the other hand, MF spectrograms rely
on the phase estimation using Griffin-Lim’s method, thus the
reconstructed audio is quite noisy (SNR < 20dB). Therefore,
the SNR for the audio reconstructed from MF spectrograms is
quite misleading because the noisy reconstruction also masks
the adversarial perturbation.
TABLE VII
MEAN SNR AND STANDARD DEVIATION (SD) COMPUTED BY (4) FOR THE
AUDIO RECONSTRUCTED FROM THE PERTURBED STFT AND MF
SPECTROGRAMS BY THE FGSM AND BIM ATTACKS.
Input Attack SNRdB(x,v) ± SD
Audio Reconstructed None >90
(STFT) FGSM 14.62±5.93
BIM 20.19±5.95
Audio Reconstructed None 8.71±11.77
(MF) FGSM 42.69±9.45
BIM 44.21±9.90
The qualitative experiment was very limited and it was
conducted with only four listeners using the speakers of a
desktop computer. Pairs of legitimate and adversarial audio of
the same song in a random order were presented to listeners
and they pointed out whether they perceive or not differences
in the audio samples. The results are disappointing because in
average, listeners have noticed audible difference in all audio
pairs. Nevertheless, most of the listeners referred to a ”small
background noise” which is not even close to change the
perception of the listeners about the musical genre. Several
examples of legitimate and adversarial audio samples are
available to readers2.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a 2D CNN for music genre classifica-
tion and evaluated it with two 2D representations: MF spectro-
grams and STFT spectrograms. The proposed approach learns
from spectrograms of audio segments and performs relatively
well compared to the state-of-the-art on the GTZAN dataset.
The proposed 2D CNN achieved 81.87% and 75.84% of mean
accuracy for MF and STFT spectrograms, respectively. Even if
spectrograms seem to be advantageous to model in a compact
and informative way the spectrum of frequencies of an audio
signal as it varies with time, such 2D representations and 2D
CNN models may not be the safest ones when it comes to
robustness against adversarial attacks.
In this paper we have shown that adversarial attacks de-
signed to regular images can also harm 2D representation
of audio signals since the perturbations remain visually im-
perceptible on spectrogram images. FGSM and BIM attacks
2https://github.com/karlmiko/ijcnn2020
successfully fooled the 2D CNN in the task of music genre
classification. These adversarial examples produced using 2D
representation and a 2D CNN model were then transferred to
audio waveforms. The audio waveforms produced were tested
against a 1D CNN model and successfully fooled it. Therefore,
we have shown the transferability of adversarial perturbations
across representations. These results expose the vulnerability
of both 1D and 2D CNN architectures to adversarial attacks.
The audio signals reconstructed from STFT spectrograms
using the phase information have a very high SNR and
the adversarial audio reconstructed from such spectrograms
have SNRs between 14dB and 20dB. Nevertheless, the recon-
structed adversarial audio examples are distinguishable from
their legitimate counterparts to human perception according
to the outcome of the qualitative evaluation. Even if the
audio signals reconstructed from MF spectrograms do not have
SNRs as high as those achieved using STFT spectrograms, the
adversarial audio reconstructed from MF spectrograms have
SNR greater than 20dB, which is mostly due to the noise
introduced in the reconstruction process and not the adversarial
perturbations.
Future work related to this paper includes adding acoustic
perceptual considerations to eliminate spectral components in
a way that no difference is perceived by the listeners. Also,
since we showed the transferability of adversarial perturba-
tions, future work includes the possibility of creating black-
box adversarial attacks to 1D CNN models by using auxiliary
2D CNN models to produce adversarial images and then have
them transferred to audio waveforms.
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